

Imports of intelligence needed analysis or when this kind of  
was unique or positive intelligence operations.

At same was understandably cautious in raising my  
claims over the possibility of MRBNs in Cuba.

[Cunning did not "ignore strong, direct evidence"  
on missiles. Direct evidence was weak; instead  
of it was appropriate.

Problem was 3 prior poles, preconceptions  
and second of them, of was built up, speed, scale,  
processions not treated as  
"indirect evidence."

[These things were as likely given 3D intent  
not to put in MRBNs as given intent to put in  
missiles. Since, "that as direct" <sup>after Aug 29,</sup>

(Except to Moscow's file fourth 3D was accepted  
- puzzling i.e. unpredictable, unpredictable, unless  
does want to put in MRBNs.)]

?  
A mistake: lack of direct evidence taken as over strong  
evidence - but similar would not appear soon.

22  
In 30 days ending Aug. 1, only 7 reports on "mud" (water).  
Next 30 days, more than 40; and about 40 between 20 Sept.

and 14 Oct., including a few on large masses.

In other period, 6 reports ending 5 Oct. 28, 4 on May 25.

(continued?)  
In mid-Sept., no evidence of Gov's intentions and no  
evidence that Strat. masses had already arrived.

15 Sept. Letter from command: plotted zone in Paseo del Rio  
guarded by trees 20 of 7 ft; access to garage controlled;  
barricades removed with masses. Disseminated 13 2 ft.

Agent: cables piled on 7 ft: ready for RBNs.

Distance. 20 2 ft

Agent: top of rear plane: lone stone markers. 21 8 ft.

Refugee: convoy, 12 2 ft, others 85 4 ft <sup>intercepted</sup> 21 2 ft

Refugee: 6 trucks, convoy, front broken on 2 ft 23 8 ft

" " <sup>6 long trucks</sup> stone markers, right of 17 ft, convoy 10 ft

Agent: isolated at Paseo, 19 ft 17 2 ft; 14 ft 20 ft

23  
(comment: very likely that some seemed  
isolated to  
state " 14 ft marker big isolated")

Refugee: isolated at Paseo. 20 ft

More later, but these enough for strong impression

April - 8 pts. over 1000 reports from CIA by clandestine sources

April - Oct. 5700 51 pts.

8700 reports from refugees, CIA - Det.

Reports in these units of Project indicated to community that  
spur and magnitude of influx of CIA personnel +  
equipment into a non-CIA country was unprecedented in  
host country and activities.

These refugee reports were as obviously biased that all  
while refugee reporting seemed to be registered with strong  
recitations. — Testimony, using every approach they could to  
affirm US to elaborate cover from CIA.

[Question of bias → reports of "prosecutors" by  
CIA and low residential weight.]

[Though still, could influence non activities,  
help from sympathizers; focus attention on  
all these activities being very sensitive to info,  
arguing little "weight." accepting very  
high false alarm rate. — Most, privately.

Threshold for this allegedly lower than for: 1) publicly, 2) by leaders  
3) CIA, leaders, "advisors" to Presidents; 4) by Congress of "advisors"

7. Decisions on air attacks; sorties required? Why not on Saturday? (to allow cover story?) Why bad in Mecca?

8. Decision on ~~the~~ second air strike. Effect of bombing?

9. Effect of K letter.

10. What happened on air cover; decision, operation.

Mecca? Suicides? apparent success  
of air attacks on Saturday?

## Questions on Bay of Pigs - Johnson

1. Was there a chance landing would take place before election?
2. Was there a participant in the fall - as plans changed to a landing?
3. Why was small number considered adequate for landing?
4. Role in JFK's mind of his campaign pledges?
5. Fear of low reaction; of comparison to Hungary, Bay?
6. What additional US involvement could be invited, minimum?
7. Why did JFK rule out US intervention - a peace conference if so much, did this influence his later?
8. Plan for US help after gov. established in mainland?
9. How big, how soon?
10. Role of Stevenson; did he know? Did he influence Pats?
11. Was his earlier influence important?

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1961  
See far is statement by State: <sup>reports</sup> said that action would not be  
SO establish missile bases.

1955

Aug 23, 1955: you with Elba, Pres 1. instructions from  
headquarters of Army, for Langkawi (Peninsular). Do  
nothing till can judge type of terrain until then decide  
whether desirable to proceed. [After 2000 ft]

Dec 1, 1955 Pres disposed to let Langkawi proceed,  
fully Elba exposed.

May 17, 1956: Operations postponed for this day!  
Marshall's movement under existing circumstances  
[after 2000 ft - & wait?] [OK flights?] The weather change in the attitude is now then experienced!  
Sept 1, 1956: OK aerial observations from Canton Island.

OK

5. Who/why/when decided not to 'get Castro' or even  
uncover him, etc.?

6. Did Seleni burns, pushed, how many times  
would turn up in Cuba, then or later, and effect of  
this?

7. Did we ever possibly think Calvo might your intend:  
into that, one?  
(.either, we stressed the many times intend. Why?)

and private interests placed no restriction on  
type or purpose of weapons - Cuba.

If weapons were put under Cuban control,  
this would reduce chance of US attack on Cuba; but  
they wouldn't.

Why do workers in Cuba "choose" whose  
dynastic stability? more than missiles in SD?

Military equipment Cuba needs for its own defense?  
but of Germany - retro. If US would already a SD.

4. "How could Cuba be a threat to US?"

Consider comparative size + resources, of this month.

But what resources were being given  
of use of equipment in Cuba? US could have  
only + possibly put more 1000's in Cuba than  
to had 1000's in Ontario - what then of  
"little Cuba"?

Questions on Cuba:

1) What led to emphasizing danger of nuclear war (not emphasizing non-nuclear acts by US) — if the U.S. was the aggressor by definition? Why, "full retaliatory response"?

2) Why did SU maintain hostile action after Oct 22?

Were they taken completely unprepared by US statements: no plans to respond? ... Can did they even try to announce after Nov 6? ... Why no use of these plans? ... U.S. statements by Pres. of U.S. — soon? (Oct 23). (law now of Oct 73) ...

3. On retaliation: if SU had no need to put nuclear weapons in Cuba, given economy, etc., of missiles in SU, and if rockets in SU were available for retaliation, why did the U.S. put them in Cuba "for defensive purposes"? If all weapons in Cuba "belong" then can detention of them?

Effects of secrecy: Effort to keep activities X secret in one's own country (in part, to keep effort from focusing on them) may keep one from focusing attention on activities X by opponents.

## Iterations

### 1st by SWR

R's attempts to refurbish his positions on long-standing East-West issues will be formulated with an eye to preparing the ground for a new cycle of negotiations which Moscow anticipates following the US election.

2nd by SWR The outcome of his talks with Gorbachev  
will no action will be taken on the US issues till  
after the US election, suggesting the two men are counting  
closely on the problem.

Frontline got in coverage concern info on Soviet intentions  
and Cuban expansion threat. No reporting sources in  
the SO provided a specific link as to how intentions, and  
no sources close to Cuban leadership furnished anything  
specific on their decisions and actions with the build-up

DCI, FBI, DDCI, NSA, SOC

Intelligence working group

Supra General: Dir, and Staff of FBI;  
Chief, CIA-CDC; Com-DiP Dir for Internal Security;  
Assoc Dir, Task Force W/CSB

What if there had not been the intelligence before  
in Cuban? What if kind of intel. Intention to Cuban  
had been used. Was? ... Second. Differences did  
buildup notice?

Action started between Feb - March '62; 3. No internal  
interrogation March 14, '62. after reviewing preliminary findings  
of FBI - CSC, FBI - CSC. Interrogated, interview  
a collection by end of July.

May - no interrogator found interested. Action on suspended.

For review for recognition of quality from US, contentious  
to illustrate of singularity;  
need for bilateral relationship; but unwilling to  
compromise.

Same primary class of options, including:  
a. no. 1) no accommodation (co-operation  
with what will look amounts "neutral")?  
b. high level of aspiration  $\rightarrow$  willingness to  
introduce (new) principles by the of G7 and  
EU institutions

EU will insist that both should be recorded and  
this is necessary to limit other, possibly

NR 11-9-62 Tandem Bus foray Rely 21 Aug 62

for which, as a matter of general policy, the owners

utilize a limited number of drivers than can be used to

reduce head gear. Each is non-punished <sup>as far as</sup> [ ]

(and encouraged to do so from owner.)

The challenge to that is that it is not great enough

and the non-punished is not least except to

involve risk of a direct counter between 10-12 passengers

1. The first point often made is with the

out was too heavy or not that they could not be

an exception of 15% to aggregate weight <sup>say 15%</sup> [ ]

Rejection of "nationalization" means that it is not

meting Chinese criticism that China may not

allow the use of force

No evidence of any fundamental disagreement of policy in  
the light of a somewhat sketchy record of events.

(Chairman present) will not, in view, cause the  
Dues to run significantly greater risk in East-West  
controversies than they are now willing to complete.

(Dues evidently embarrassed by Castro's identification  
of Cuba with the Bloc. USSR will mind saying  
affirmatively slighting to several ways of regime, e.g. T  
he meeting members of the East. Dues afraid Cuban  
presentations, although not identical with the Bloc will  
mean that of Cuban are not the prospects for  
expanding Cuban movement & its influence in the countries.)

(Expected pressure on Berlin, but even, only about  
of USSR would be sufficient, little compulsion seen.)

see Bill Hyland from Sept 1968 on Berlin

(

extracted in first draft of SANE

INQ objected, on basis of int'l. of Det. to the  
mtg. raising from to election, the 1st plenary, <sup>+ documents</sup> ~~statements~~ can be called.

3. Aug: (Bill Hyland?) - 1.3. Treaties on Berlin - that is to

say that the chances are better than ever that.

2. more plen. little hope in further negotiations and  
have decided to move forward militarily, accomplishing  
without the various abstention of a peace treaty, and  
to some point in this process, signing it.

(Berlin - back from 6th, late July; news on the already)

no NATO treaty is imminent; threat of alliance treaty

is evident (Prussia), overall, abrogating the commitments

of the 1. Berlin, threat to East Germany

as is <sup>8/15</sup> commented on basis of this news

to 3. Sept.

"Captured" on JUNE 11-15-67

IV.3 (2nd): Three: Intake estimate right. 7

(Aug. 3 Datum der Zeit, Zeit 6)

judgment <sup>at least</sup> ~~and~~ <sup>in practice</sup> cannot be expected by the  
members.

believe, less policy is a planned attempt at

for example, is committed to being strict administrative agents.

... doubt... to have attended on many of the further illustrations now

... further evidence that there are still not decisions

of signs - please treat until big boy - when you able

To implement its basic function a schema or layer

that they consider redesigning the resources from that point.

such provision can be implemented with our clients. (acceptable)

Brant 8015 11-15-62 10.2 ft. - reflects R/V water.

"Wata" it was first seen, it

when a person's life ends,

## Formation of organic acids and

The right public law statement, "Engen" 198

was "Reassuring": "elections" were first an armed

0

process for one man's government.

2. P.L.: Current Practices in Berlin

1. It was declared a "peace" in regards over Berlin

it was the 19th June initially called out - a plan to

first 11. right for months and violated the envisaged

an intended continuation of negotiations. However, this

why that will continue to make various violations?

now is able to accomplish planned + de facto now

the changes which would flow from a peace treaty

(Division: Anger, about not 10 from 19 right!)

right statement of 19 right appears to make out a

separate treaty in the next few months. It is possible

that took appearance of its intention at the time, but

connected with the issuance of statement on 10th for that

the idea to conclude was again that a separate treaty

should have a specific shading to its Western power; and

wasn't Berlin is the beginning a cause.

(do some press statement now publicly trying  
to end & conclude that it is unlikely, but make  
concession to CIO and in discussion use "it was their plan";  
the Dept. of Justice human losses slogan is confirmed  
(and, only confirm MR is taking a general cooling-off) but  
without strong disavowal.

What should Pres. take the position? Why not  
express different views, not concessions?  
MR people commented to CIO that "to end the  
basic violence" in the land, (from that) ONE  
group of MR had one mission they didn't have; & the <sup>ONE</sup>  
right not have the ability in private, now that  
MR had nothing to do with their basic mission.

(Why not make realistic estimate after Sept 11?  
Instead of saying information (?) etc. they is a 10/11  
affair, to 11/11 attack.

Jan, 15 Ipt, I was signed agreement with  
CIA that CIA would not station missiles on its  
territory after ~~and~~ month of refusing to sign this,  
preparing for more extension, ~~concerning~~ part

asked to ~~from~~ CIA further request: "We won't  
station missiles over you, if you don't over us"

SN 15  
Memorandum, 15-3-62 Rec. Subject: Reversal of US position in Cuba  
August 10, 1962

Ans: The military buildup in Cuba, § 14.8.1b.6.2

Purposes to defend Cuba against the against what  
the USSR and Cuba consider to be a real danger that  
in any attempt to annihilate (against). I am quickly

Change from 14 left draft to 17 left draft

States: the US has granted more credits to other states, but not with much speed & flexibility, and it must wait until the itself

Adel: the (1 left) statement as a whole is probably an invitation for the question which the Carter regime almost certainly has intended.

[Signal - info - depends on perceived alternatives]

One main way of presenting the US - or of allowing Carter to present the US - is going to say the second the first with an additional handshake

Role: what role did 14 left statement for first time  
Dob-Sor? established link between "Berlin + Cuban crises" and  
agreed that no action in Cuban would be countered by  
Cuba means Germany

(and labor)

1. The Jews themselves are probably still uncertain about

their future course in Central America, they are engaged  
[future military program]

in a certain amount of recruitment, especially watching

US + CG actions as they go. [I probably intend to test

your reaction in my presence.] At the same time they

are obliged to take their policy to money, center of

expansion with the US

While it is an indisputable fact, even in the light of

recent developments, the policy remains fundamentally

unchanged, we cannot conclude the possibility that

nowhere is at least considering a change in the policy

Consequently the aim is to assign tasks to provide within  
other types of operations to allow maximal force to be  
utilized among all elements available to the US

(Charger does a shielding to which the US might  
possibly respond.)

On the whole, we believe this does not calculate  
that if, T-280 could be employed to take in  
more than very small numbers without serious risk  
of US counteraction.

(Charger does not calculate that a modest  
number of T-280 could be employed to take without  
serious risk of US counteraction.)

(Charger believes that if US reaction is slighted there  
is less of confidence in it.)

The establishment of Cuban soil of our supply forces

which would be used against the US would be

incompatible with our policy <sup>presently</sup> as we ~~cannot~~ estimate it ~~presently~~ X

It would indicate as the system will have to work

shorter than the US has imagined before, etc

1/2

in which the Pan rights but that the additional effort of

defending the US by stationing our own striking force in the

surrounding position would be worth a good deal

Provided they could get away with it, they would

almost certainly not estimate that this would be done

without provoking a dangerous US reaction X

If the military advantages of a law attempt to use  
also as a strategic strike were so marginal  
or dubious and the risks so great

[strategic attempt based on its own military  
advantages in ... the risks would be great ...]

The political implication was extremely adverse  
[France would run counter to the kind of policy the  
US was actually pursuing in C.A.]

test: The extension of law military power into the  
American country by hindrance to that power

[Postscript to France: it addressed; French government  
intended that France was being attacked  
in common with other belligerents because of Cuban situation  
it went well after that. It thought to attack France  
postscript to inform on law portion affected  
after situation - which France did not think would be  
fair that by risks of conflict with US

likely for an I&P reaction to proceed inside bars:

It is unlikely that the bars as a whole could be

brought together in a kind of unit action. It is

almost certain that the bars would be split between

sections necessitating a maintenance position as these conflicting  
orientations

I&P 2 ft. PES most conclusion

(Min. bars) would not be incompatible with 2 as practice

to date and is not the policy as we frequently estimate its

Point: 1) Possibly K thought that by 21st 13 Oct

already knew at least of preparations for NODS,

maybe 20-25, but decided to ignore.

2) JFK on morning of 21 Oct (like Thompson, RFK) - If

we were in this one, clear for great breakthrough  
to advanced negotiations.

3) High-staking mostly Rm on evening of 26 Oct;

argue that we were getting out of its intents,

concern on Turkey: negotiation to deal on 27 Oct,

if we had to...

Argue at 26th - but why? For clarifying 26 Oct  
stale?

2) Demand? For clarifying 26 Oct, for Turkey? For

making it necessary for us to negotiate, harder to negotiate -

instead of having us give to others, if necessary?

4. Private channel - averages personal investments,

"a statement," fully by personal committee in  
public, understanding

[thinks to person in government K, he]

"he couldn't man," "he couldn't do that to me"]

Thompson nationally involved with K

5 & then to broader committee in anthropological, cultural

talk - from the committee lead him to full self-dispersion

other, but he has reported himself (very short interview?)

several times, cultural interests private time,

including mostly reference to Africa (to Melville, along

reference material; from H. Brack, "Germany divided,"

from the front, "Germany still not case open.")

several shows

6. Personal: Japanese, American - really wanted to talk with  
"Do you want to name your own - photo?"

He is Japanese. (he did) also Japanese. Obviously felt

very little about what he talked (at first day?)

Japan would be second with be released on 1000 companies

Fulbright funded. (Melville? (Kenya?))

## Personal History

1. Did you offer legal advice in relation with CEO's name  
of action? Is it valid? Appeal? Application to  
compensate?

2. Who from you were drafted for his letters from  
K?

3. Who and contact more than in private channel? How  
different from public? (From: State with recom-  
mend for additional publication).

They did not receive confirmation, though I did

to repeat himself; contrary to other cases, I didn't  
know about his most past mistakes, basis for criticism  
base for decision; without problem?

Did he ever respond to my question in telecon?

Did time ever change from him?

He did not, did to say "I am going to teach you?"

Murach, Kap & Cba

1. Two distinct initial "philosophies" regarding:

a) 1957-61: OSCE (IUG): 80 treaties, effluent limits,

plus OS - mention toward the principal objectives

centralized; strict limiting strategy? (E. and W. 2nd? )

(E. and W. 2nd, wouldn't make confrontation easy)

Problem of E. didn't have to comply, wouldn't gamble

on opponents' reaction; wouldn't only in effect of

force on E. (U.S.)

b) C.C. (E.U.): 80 countries, easy to start confrontation,

1) Does E.U. now analyze: Really the nature of

limits of resistance that to be decided by Policy-making

united statement

✓ =

10:00 AM	8 Aug: DCI briefs to the City Com on my 2d, 2000-07-19 (NYRBM)
8 AM	10 Aug: Taylor agents for review of new info, and US cont. feel the possibility that of USSR that has been to rights in India as a step it, contd. justly members of US missile teams in
10:00 - 11:00 prior to move of SFR	10 Aug: 2d phase of 2nd (the 2nd) missiles 8 Aug: 2d day flight, writing again scheduled for period beginning 19 Aug: the 2nd
11:00 AM	10 Aug: 2nd day: Davis, New, N, McN, J, SFR, Taylor, New, McN, etc.
11:00 AM	10 Aug: 2nd day: possible. NYRBM Circumstances possible, because of US actions
4:00 PM	11 Aug: 2d day -
21 Aug: my 2nd missile wine	21 Aug: DCI briefs Rose on this DCI discusses 2d day on 21 Aug
11 AM	11 Aug: 2d day: possible US missile teams, prob included some.

18 Aug: Chestnut could be spared.

18 Aug: anti-air squad action 2 patrols for US actions.

against: N. S. A. 181.

action of air (?)

of messages

of anti-air ... + same 3 hrs (Early morning, 22 Aug.)

in by 1133 (3-1) - left. of 31 Aug,

initial result (?) of 22 Aug morning.

19 Aug: Get started anti-air 8 hrs, move to Rangoon, 26 Aug

27 Aug: On board Cuban freighter to Pusan, 30 (Aug).

72 ft. left.

21 Aug: 29 Aug: to 1130, bilan anti-air on

air. building.

72 ft. <sup>bottom</sup> attempt to float it down at 1030 hrs.

from 22 Aug, 8-9 hrs will be abandoned.

✓

23 Aug 1981: Custer, MT That m

27 Nov., 1903. Final payment of taxes; was not over

From 1st day of 20 Aug 1944 to 1st day of 20 Aug 1945 by instalments, related to

not from tents ~~as~~ with new local photos

Dec. 21st 1949 23 mi to West Valley, Est. 15

my 20 May for Review, returnal 23 light

SG 30 Aug. (Total of 20 dry flasks?)

From total in Chortitza, 31 Aug.

Aug 25-26. Central English Events for Peter and Paul.

Exhibit 6 Exhibit [for name; restriction to Sec. 7817]

For more detailed information, see my flight log in [Logbook](#).

to support the author and his wife with a family.

— at 6:00 a.m. (Continued from Dr. McLean)

Left, a similar take, but different in style.

( See - total info )

11

13. 10. 1968: 10-2 initially wanted to visit Sharm, range.

13. 10. 1968: COMINT: 1 request of 2, several vehicles available for visit of range.

13. 10. 1968: Center to MEU,

14. 10. 1968: 10-2 advised 86 on state for bus. And claim of losses, no financial compensation, just wait till arrival of further U-2 wreckage, in basket.

14. 10. 1968: CIA study concluding former site was S-2 control house.

18. 10. 1968: item in 10-2

13. 10. 1968: US-2 informed: [Final Post mortem of wreckage of plane before making statement.]

inc.

(Aug?)

10. 10. 1968: initial time: 10-2, COMINT, Center, handles

case

11. 10. 1968: 10-2 and 10-3 are updating information in 9. 10. 1968,

by 10-2. 4) Shift 2nd of first flight, case now flag

Wires, reluctance to work in direction 2 10-2

✓

① Removal 1969. was planned (as 6 way).

Final instl. - most low - not used as to reduce

a wave of alarm in a city that hasn't been injured.

Picture of second. other alarm system

(earlier, in 1968) had been planned in Nov of Aug 1

and this first round fully reported. Since, nothing

came out as a start, but as a problem to be dealt

with ultimately (May 1969. was planned to allow use

of injury of 23 May, know nothing else known)

[Crimes of 23 May - 52 ft over]

Planned to provide systematic coverage of part of Alice

for full story. To immediate need for re-coverage of

area of 2 previous injuries.

② Finally, situations involving imminent homicide;

law from a Death, after shooting

[6 Sept; Auto-Pac, Auto-Stop] [Post-1968]

Blow could not damage. Police as nothing done.

[Thus, free of homicide]

R reported to Type (?) standard weight of C14.

Increasing number of island.

SS to low number ratio.

(No written record of distance not to modify from 3000,

but in ultimate approach for tracks & it was necessary (?)

& made several 3000s.

Run straight (antennae) & left flight in relation to

run, running of wind & pilot greater — 1000

Run straight until they're aligned.

Give 3000s in distance, engine diagnosis in distance

flight in case of need of landing & wind, possibly

in case E?

Set failed to give advance weight to base of tail to

end to front hook of running to base forward

Flight will be influenced by tail — protection

and insulation. May need to land at 3000

and fly with tail up (constant effort

and fly with tail up (constant effort

6. T. II seen. Thirty or more of these passed longways

for use, being balanced when below pattern was  
<sup>marked</sup>  
already different.

Also, balloon program track pattern is repeat,  
when the program is supplied from manual by balloonists,  
during the first moment, until the tracking changed  
to accelerate during a period of many (6 miles)  
managed by balloons conduct initially under manual tracking  
command, even though position was not initial;  
right of course. Autop.

Re vision, 1945 indicated when observing with telescope

as request & against continual sunlight; could it

that C. I. refraction

DCI

7945: Call to Carter using frequent repeat name;

"my hand is in right hand <sup>present</sup> 50 short-range

2000 ft forward type [Scud 287] with total command

important target & 55-65 + low. Visible"

10000 ft: "Doubtless is it possible, possible?"

10215: "Difficult for me to reasonably estimate with

(13, 16, 20) defenses being established, when ... from to

10000 ft ENE (SE? SW?) we quite feasible maximum condition

as for number of existing means of some

defensive capability such as means to be

installed by time when present threat constituted

and create element

from

of anti-aircraft, <sup>to</sup> night + target

DNT: Only action ...

in left: Do not wish to be ready planning this matter

but believe this would be best time inform

of means of existing and short introduction of

pref. target forward target, our capacities existing



one color defense system position."

[One, etc. in effect comes all products on basis  
of US capability; it's based on US will, which  
you C + K have more about than estimation.]

20 Sept: reservation on NIE: "as an alternative to cancellation

that an offensive in one color will provide  
Zam will most difficult effective defending position  
in connection w/ all other criteria near and base  
Sov right to be reinforced with to substantial reinforcement  
position."

As a result of DC's pressure, negotiations terminated  
of other methods of war (DC had called a 27 Aug;  
called on 7 Sept, but Indirect about even on 7 Sept 13)

Note: The negotiations were in terms of what might be  
done immediately after the establishment of a complete

SA-2 defensive police area of U-2 operating, with the



SNIS. What are the results?

"What are they (Kuomintang and TUD) after the election?

What the position be better than? (Not much.)

What are reasons for helping them? ("No")

Just to be nice? So get return favor?

Effect of July-Box, etc: to reduce incidents

to reduce incidents; and to add to cost of  
incidents? (Also the feeling that we don't want  
there would be an tension with incidents + US  
because there would be trouble, in border?)

What are our plans in case of incidents?

What was our expectation of US response?

What is what is July-5 + Aug 10 Right and how  
not done?

What would we have done? Expected?

What would the have done? Allies?

Find out from friend of MAFF?

## Elections

Do views really mean what? When does  
conflict break? (Bush vs. Clinton? Iraq?)  
(Did they only seem strong, or provide an excuse  
for inattention, inaction?) (Dowry? Korea? Cuba?)

Or is it merely posturing to act conflict,  
noting existing disagreements to commit to conflict,  
only later then invoking it? e.g. the following  
Bush statements; U.S. insisted on right to exist to control Iraq.

Final altitude of Pres. S. toward U.S. incident  
differs from in 1995? In which case did  
behavior in May 1994? In which case did  
U.S. concede negotiations? Did the Pres. date of May  
1994? e.g. water negotiations (not?)

important thought that only at the last would the  
base visit the introduction of such weapon in MAFMSI

1) Since a) M.C. thought MAFMSI would not come till

very late; did not that they were already in? .

What did M.C. respond to them they were already in?

What other specifically important at the conference?

c) Other was nothing to do, other more than U-2 if necessary.

i) Question if U-2 had been shot down, a big attack?

Might not have caused suspicion, need for surveillance;

perhaps SGI within to be more difficult to reveal more?

What then?

e) Then why was other - SGI remained in situation

in SGI a number of days?

f) Did M.C. think, now, that U-2 program was adequate

for fight? Did he press for coverage before 10 Oct?

128-28954

18 Sept, 1945: Carter stated during to me. QF-1010  
new idea; B-52s also could be programmed to SG

(On 12 Sept, Carter gave to me B-52s "program" for  
nations (including SG approach) to provide for replacement  
of aircraft by higher altitude of tactical-type aircraft  
against anti-aircraft.

19 Sept. 1945. In fact SG in low level of against  
C-45, but B-52s (above)

Carter said: "we can't get in close to collection in  
Asia; therefore the B-52s would move from the  
fronts of decision into warheads."

7 (Action required in 12 Sept plan ref)  
consideration of use of  
SG approach. B-52s at next meeting.

27 Sept, Carter forwarded to U.S. program for the use.

Program (29 Sept-2 Oct) programmed to move B-52s

but slow, small

182.11. Isostatic est. of the thickness 4-30

1798: Correspondent referred to France

in left: The Training Center (Our request).

17 1.11: strange branch. Draw. + for. off. inc.

3 Oct: the { 65 brief.

90:t. Common-

~~First range equipped for the Constitutional battle in April, 19~~

Marcel 7-8 ft. Pulte... 10-12 ft. First coming fruit.

site 2, 17.9.87: probably first tree fallen might be

distressed.

~~Mass construction of housing took in 15 fifth~~

Paris: several incidents reported by law men, from

Visited to KCCM, Inman Aug 10 (before my last visit)

21 will go to a meeting to decide exactly before

1 for 6 in. 2 to 6 in. late 11-12 in. or

6 May 12, NDIC started with State Evaluation of

Japan Cyber. Estimate 21 May - 5 Jun (7 days)

NDIC examined 125 raw reports received from FO; only 3 steel mills met that could be linked to SEMI members; VPCC reported block 3.

14 May C1 submitted draft of NDIC's final [from NDC?] not

to publish in its own magazine because till it had

been submitted at 11:00C. (matter of intell.

Technique, not policy)

[Anticipated as banning publication without permission]

C1 rechecks NDIC (10 May) and adds 25 reports reports.

4 more by phone; in all now NDIC adds back 11

more reports or make a negative finding.

[Did this stop publishing?]

5. Left, 883 reports in internal database and

now (only the 1121 publishable portion of non-confidential).

Knowledge of analysts state deployment of SAM

was going on (after 20 Aug - 5 Sept) plus difficulty in

internal clearance in tally whom from other nodes,

severed NEAM deployment.

[e.g. would make it harder for operator to

justify the new policy of committing;

o to communicate the combined weight of efforts.]

[Was operator/analyst been caught in false

alarm during the process?]

However, the committed alarm was targeted for user, not

as another function where illegal nuclear activity was

to be should be reported by function 3 was this a

category? But is a major SS-2 auto. Power tool.

(?)

Request for information to target analysis. Pts on 7 Sept;

alarm on 21 Sept, 26/7 Sept, around 27 Sept; looked

the same colour. Could on 23 Sept (Coms targeting)

hitting bank, largely C4)

Priority requirements should cover [standard] for  
loss before inside construction, particular attention to SS-4

Layer [standard]

Blocks 27 right, right lane, mainline item. for CR, weight  
for inspection. 13915.

13915.0000 (only found for SS).

(Meanwhile, other "standard" construction - right lane left  
construction ongoing. (But, only in CR?)

Inspection liability apply to Chestnut, but nature of this  
(what?) does for Cuban who largely on the Cuban

Q: Is liability to Cuban team still apply; the cut off

as you are an off-line contractor (Contractor aspect)

[Cut off Date?]

by whom value of work retained on Cuban?

With Chestnut group, or any other CR officers

know that ownership of 4000' base had been retained by CR  
and severely discounted with Pascualis and the contractor

(COSCOM 181 didn't comment down, except a form of SWS 5).

Would it be some kind of a political issue?

Analysts were writing to the <sup>too</sup> ~~potential~~ political  
input of the reports they were writing; the world  
not have influence them against publication, but would  
have made them want to be ~~double sure~~ <sup>more</sup> explicit  
with writing back to our ~~man~~ <sup>man</sup> in Africa.

Also, rigid compartmentation between COSCOM - 86

one responsible for collection and the other analysts.

For if my COSCOM analysts on River problem can talk about  
changes. Here, they did not know that no  
mention of River to Side A, Los Villas were included  
in ~~that~~ <sup>that</sup> program or that the program was already obtained.

They had no way of knowing that the ~~that~~ <sup>that</sup> program the  
had requested would not be forthcoming, so they might  
well have delayed publication from day to day in hope of receiving it.

What I say, item would have appeared in Cuban Daily  
Democracy, does might have come in Cuban Daily  
Democracy, does might have come in Cuban Daily (prob.  
not Cuban government source, because for (18) ; is Pro  
right, has - General, there was Cuban activity around  
in Cristobal about 2 weeks before he apparently died.  
In Cuban too, but source not published

Prob. that SG first heard of this concern on  
9 Oct.

Up to 7-10 days before, analytic compilation of information  
SG acting, due to unknown presence of Cuban structure (?)  
authorizing SG ; Madison  
ultimata justification of  
and reason was made, / reason being to early days  
of U-2 ops. Extended for control of ultimate destination  
from USCG, not for testing (cigar) situation. After  
10 Oct they were gathered.

[But, now?]

left program took 26 days from 12 feet (constant  
in about 10 feet minimum and then been increased)

Started 7 Oct. (Cloud cover minimum on 17 Oct.;

26 feet min. 29th Oct. of Pms - by 3 Pms;  
5 feet minimum, 7 Oct. (continued).

On 10 days with 26 feet min. mean ~~out~~ <sup>out</sup> minimum  
( $< 15\%$  cloud cover).

Effect of 85 hours of 1978 weather <sup>over 1000</sup> on  
the consideration (?) of what mean should be used.

Still only 80 hours.

Randy & Hansen who told me to "wait"

By late 9 pts, delay now (?) - now of wisdom  
of continual low build-up, had generated greatly  
increased area of injury in West. [What?]

But high level consideration of PRAMS always in  
time of low return after CG's fully positioned.

To the wisdom of return toward weight of CG -  
defended now till CG (2<sup>nd</sup>) auto of 4 Oct

DCI: 0-2 flight now now (below last, 1st flight) restricted  
by presence of CGs to 50% gradient of climb; questioned  
whether this was a reasonable restriction at the time,  
particularly since CGs were almost certainly not present  
[Did they agree on restriction?]

CG endorsed. NRO (Smart!) to pursue overall program  
for return of CGs for auto of 9 Oct.

6 Oct: COMIR now to NRO to tell flight: "begin to."

UIC committed this on 6 Oct.

Andy & Hansen, to total flight "begin to"

9 Oct. 56: 180° first recommendation: On 2nd floor walls

except N.E. as even as weather permits

Exhibit also to have been one of 3000 others

that are not now operational.

Second day (?) subject to Stern's letter of 3000

to compare with a fully complete 180° coverage as

best is possible.

Now if necessary <sup>3000</sup> if there is no ~~any~~ objection

to the initial 180° route, ~~maximum coverage of~~

western end of island by multiple 180° contingencies

as even as weather permits

Exhibit?

SS would stand by 1st, Paus stand by

Second (?) Drawing of the initial route to the

far. Minus objecting until 19 Oct.

19 Oct. 56: account that with even 3000 not in b.

would have been packed at yesterday's?

Bundy & Hansen, 10 Oct. 1956

After this memo approved, CIB received on 10 Oct.

Play plan of 28 Oct & 11-22 water (see by U-2 on  
17 Oct, along with others) in Committee of 11 Oct.

(after 16 Oct)

10 Oct: DCI briefs CIB Sub-committee of three. Abtrap in  
buildup, notably IL-28s. Commented on NRSM: on  
basis of cover, adding that there were many intercepts  
but did not believe the down and make analysis  
now, but is different with them; told DCI  
had a flight for next day - on

11 Oct: Carter to Hartnell; 400 ft. water [10 Oct]

and, refugee who has no land evidence.

12 Oct: Carter to Hartnell - has been (before, pointer available).

13 Oct: Dr. NMIC told DCI, early morning; DCI - Carter.

Carter said and tell Taylor & Carroll, 100 ft. water to

[big time?] as up became known, anti-social not to

wait till morning to 100 ft. - 100 ft. about 2200 to forward to  
Carter & Hartnell, who told Hartnell, Hartnell - DCI briefs Hartnell.

until actual deployment.

Nothing on law states preparation for deployment to war base.

4 July Checklist: Paul 2nd time back, meeting more law  
and. and I. especially more advanced arguments  
and on May-21 and 22nd which SSI already  
providing to Submarines, flight testing.

13 July: C. Paul had left Norway without travel liberty  
or commissary, "a pretty good sign that visit was  
unproductive."

1 Aug 67: NIE 55-2-12 14. Preparations taken on initial  
founding for Norway.

2. Eg. first of circumstances 1958 & following ever since  
SISI committed to pursue, strengthen the Arctic region  
SISI, however, has avoided in formal commitment to protect  
and defend the region in all contingencies  
3) in we also believe it unlikely that Polar will station  
is also the contact route of my description, at least for  
leaving the east.

c. The laws would eventually cover intervals  
to large areas over large distances,  
but laws might not reach the regions that China  
uses with the protection of the military power

d. We believe that China will return to its  
existing positions, to also [to defend its territory]  
and policy which not includes the protection of  
new colonized out fighting, base, modern airports, or  
new or other members of the U.S.S.R.

I. Probable meaning of "eventually"  
believe  
and does not protect

1 Aug 2003 returned paper & went on if not all

also probably -- carrying military cargo to Abu

(as. NCOs comment on own info. its consideration of part

of Royal Air Force & Royal Artillery units to

take boat across was mentioned.)

(DR thought increased shipping due to Trade, tell 22 Aug?)

4 Aug: CH: info about some, "then"

2 Aug: unconfirmed information about info.

2 Aug: DR: Critical Policy Change, referring, arrival of

Inv military info in transmission.

20 Aug: 1997 version of DPA

2 Aug: CH: pub 34%

3 Aug, 25 Aug

10 fly Taylor, because of continuous use of name in  
following Chinese and not in English, which is  
for comp. names of names

16 fly: DDCI recommended to DCI that U-2 flights over  
Asia be continued to the extent possible and  
in justification, mention mission and president  
"preserves evidence that incoming reports of rebels  
is reliable. Because in Ref. one one holy," and  
"is an most important mission for my evidence of  
delays of SS-2 mission and the MIG-15 in China."

Approved by DCI on 19 Aug, the Pres.

21 Aug 1961 R. McN. J. DCP Ig. Secy, DCI

22 Aug 1961 analysis of photo ref. photo found  
reports of rebels <sup>AM. 1961</sup> China ~~not~~ <sup>AM. 1961</sup> ref.  
meeting DCI

21 Aug: DCI total break for available time, 10 Aug

initial visit few water from mainly

House, had initial SAGS; raised some of

FROM:

Enterprise

Recipe for Total Empire Despite Warning —

## Improbable Often to Events

2d Points

- A. Strong belief that danger, if any, will not come before a certain date; all actions remaining consistent with this
- B. Strong incentives not to prepare for it, plan, or prevent sooner than necessary (i.e. before a certain date, say, 6 months) — until prevention — Pearl Harbor — or (friendly 'invasion') unless necessary) to avoid becoming public (mention, revealing intention) — Oklahoma.
- C. Limitations on reason, forcing posture, to avoid preventing larger errors, or at all, or to provide grounds for saying to ~~or instead~~ critics: "I was ~~not~~ preventing"
- D. Restrictions on dissemination of info — relating to future threat — subject to interpretation as indicating current threat (in which you don't believe, and don't want to act against). Lucy calls Pearl Harbor threat: But Belief that threat is to different place; Strong wish not to prepare for possibility that threat will be (when it comes).

(much)  
Thus, silence is thoroughly consistent with  
threats A and B. (Attack now or attack later;  
attack later, no attack; attack here, attack there;  
attack this way, or that.)

I believe strongly because of presumption, general, private  
silence, that B is much more likely than A. In fact,  
A is highly unlikely. But I do not wish to reveal that  
there is new evidence supporting A:

1) I do not wish to reveal source of info.

or 2) I can't reveal crucial part of evidence supporting A  
part of a list

or 3) public has different presumptions, prior beliefs;

new evidence would lead them to change action.

4) Part of public or classical interests wishes discrepancy...

5) " " " " " have different goals-values; if

this situation ever occurred in A as possible, would change action.

6) There are costs, constraints, risks that can't be revealed to

public, or public would evaluate differently, or public is ignorant of.  
Possibility of action, effectiveness, less than public knows or can be told.

7) In particular, newly come initial expectation of A to being or

Ullis might trigger uncharitable reaction.

or the plan, etc. in "too certly" for the new trusts relating to this.

F. 7.3




Moreover: (i) if side B is secret, then B's (wait for communism aspect) discrepancy (e.g. if it could be done secretly: no visits, no signs, to public, allies, etc.)

(ii) if can prepare for B, can't prepare without preparing for A, or even while unpreparing for A (increasing vulnerability, raising costs of A res should occur, neglecting A, neglecting A will not occur, threatening immediately costly res if A should occur, doing nothing to deter.  $\ominus$ )

[Cba: desire to remove cities that John argued on  
assumptions of A, would not fit A, while emphasizing that no  
immediate prob of A: prediction + threat, "warning" (public  
warning ignored by SO. — bsp.)] defines

B OR: (i) <sup>2)</sup> that + can, but no preparing for B with no risk;

(ii) right street is not farmer to B, it will costs (Even,



4.1

Given: I refrain from preparing for A at all & even  
desperately. I even refrain from preparing for B.

Then A occurs. To, B occurs, and nothing  
else (i) & (ii) & (iii) above turn out wrong.

Trouble explaining why no preparation, apparently about  
no expectation of A, when there was value pointing to A;  
but when Prepared A is wrong, or even unreasonable, or  
easier for it can't be reversed;  
and/or Prepared B can't be explained.

So, total failure to prepare for A occurs  
inevitably ; either negligent, or deliberately malicious.  
(i.e. not to prepare for something that is expected, and is  
expected to be worth for action ; for individual & ulterior goal).

(Truth: it <sup>was</sup> regarded as low prob, but didn't act on it;  
to prepare for it at all, or to focus public attention on it,  
or to reject belief by public action that it has very  
the moderately low prob that was valid.)



Meanwhile, there is every description of public  
or other that there is any violence contesting A  
(A com. agent it as invinc. or destroy the it will  
but to other, is overruled by the other,  
or a "story for A vs. C, but only generated by and  
uniting to B.")  
into a disputation. like.

Special case:

You half-expect B, but you want it to come as a  
surprise : to other, public, Congress, etc. → is  
opponent surprise to you.

For arranging this surprise, A occurs as a real  
misfortune, not the itself.  
and rise to you — and finds you totally unprepared, for  
never had to explore — connected with efforts to ensure that  
B will come, if at all, as surprise.

[B right in our action: a desire (not desire)]

For achieving first example 1) encourage above state of mind  
2) don't encourage counter-dependencies, predictions; 3. don't wait on  
opponents ability to keep surprise if A want.



Reasons why <sup>a)</sup> negative evidence regarded as strong  
 and <sup>b)</sup> positive as weak

f M&S 34

- 1) I thought now that the original, not only for IBM (there were differences in the 2) but for SS-4 (that MCC expect SS-4 in "fixed code" -  
 - SS-1-5?)
- 2) Errors, confusion in S1?
- 3) Any use of private memory? (With reference to redundancy)  
 of decisions: esp. given - E. question, the memory, failing contacts  
  - a) 50 failures, to user, failing to detect, need, no evidence?
  - b) 50 such that cancel off?
  - c) inconsistency of codes reported, cancel code of total report,  
cancel
  - d) Inhibited means of refusing to accept a command, "cancel"
  - e) Unintended decisions; question of logic
- 4) Reasons for use of S1, to forward messages  
 [Indirectly, if desired, indication of some difficulties]
- 5) Patients' employment by a PC. Evaluate patient labour on average?
- 6) Total analysis hours of 4600 is better?

6) ?) were you heavily involved; +/-(?)

3 (7) (Chairman): Analysts didn't want to clear program  
wanted to det  
didn't have info on being cleared externally, thought this was

Admin was putting strongly into that A - M&PMs

before election - wouldn't know; was not specifying  
degree of concern (e.g. SC, Director, Agency, National, Lester  
in that is - in the election is after still  
presentational (into specifying of program, for personnel  
advantages

just like day.

1) What was we doing to det B?

2) In retrospect, would it have been enough? Or would more

exceptions of freedom would have been understanding (what)?

3) What would we have done if SC had "nowhere"

After this to "det" was 11:00am

2) quickly but without friction would suffice?

The background: what is a second good topic?

J J J J J + J - J - J J

Paul Silver - Long <sup>(105)</sup> - Cuba "lynchings" -

No insurance against threat is because so as not  
to reward negligent conduct over reckless, which threats  
negligent insurance users

(high cost of threat & - if don't know threat - with certainty  
and that insurance agent is - negligent - can be  
caught, liable, and liable to pay any amount)

This would be Miranda-Lip Pattern

Was a Paul Silver possible - if so what would it be?

Was relevant: class a CUBA possible?

(if only 100% had been violent, then wouldn't look  
bad from point of view of will + action;  
wasn't there adequate relation to reckless conduct -

Plan of reliance seems to be very poor and not sufficient  
to justify negligent conduct in the ALB case  
bad to negligent conduct

8:00 a.m. 12 km. 11 tent w/ H

10 km. 11. 8.45 + 2.

5:45 10 km. 11 tent w/ D

6:30 Puller + 131.

UT with factors.

## Initial Planning:

Preparation plan running to like, like!

• Constitution - a plan to a foreign country

is functional - foreign

(e.g. foreign in initial imports, that is:

mainly imports (190, 1900), and 10% of chart 6,

especially, may - much later)

for foreign go both to the state, Philippines;

e.g. the disseminator, contact for staff work,

constitution may be functional, for imports

then, it is not only "rate" that may be functional  
in foreign (in form of bank, etc. in the system later)

• high level decision, but also "central" control  
of foreign (disseminator) - RECENT AND SECRET

initial action may be functional as foreign's

planning, imports, etc., etc. (foreign, marketing)

etc. state

(at long, last)

PROBLEMS: DESIGN: CONSTRUCTION: MAINTENANCE: TESTS



Thurs Oct 25

Environ. 10 5.

Brody & O'Neal - 2:19 Knob LUT

2:26 (Tl. to sec. 1, max. in mid dist. cont.)

S.C. 17th October 1911.

11:50 Sat. morn the instruments went back.

at 8 am. May intercept Enchanted

Feb. 20th 1892 10 a.m.

7:50 am Manito loaded.

6 pm after him.

letter from a 70 year old woman.

Infant measures 30.

over 50. 9:35: last fire alarm, "minutes" 2

Collecting freshwater mites + stiff 3:35 pm on 6-3-90. Part  
3:35 pm. Left for home. Mites common to the Transverse

Oct 23 8:00 a.m. 10:45 a.m. <sup>Breakfast</sup> Premium Page of Standard.

8:00 a.m. breakfast 10:45 a.m.

Breakfast 10:45 a.m.

9 a.m. Breakfast to 12:30 a.m. Page of Standard.

12:30 OAS conference

4:30 p.m. 15-minutes with President meeting Oberlin.

Evening interviews

4 p.m. Start to S.C.

start

Oct 24 8:00 a.m. 10 a.m. take off.

9. S.C.

2:00 Start arrangement and t.

3:24 p.m. Start to S.C.

3:59 p.m. Start to S.C. + head council + the Board  
(Board meeting)

(10:30 a.m. 11:30 a.m.)

[Power base can be used to

a) achieve national objectives, internal, external

b) assist internal targets

c) assist external political targets, for

d) achieve peaceful, want to : Peace, Non-violence, Democracy

Non-violence is our national power for

(a) or (b) [Later] I could read approximately to

that State power would be willing to use it, for

(c) or (d) — we thought "justified" for (a), "unjustified"

for (C) — (d).

law power, + PEACE = the other nature

P, H, F in US, and create political targets for

Peace Action. Peace has no "rights" to negotiate

freely, or even to object, yet if he accepts this

it will not only undermine his prestige, & voters, and

good books; but it will allow his enemies will believe

he will never have power (i.e., without the

unjustified) intervention will not hurt). But at Pk.

52 725

52 - Dangon (1)

Thuday, Keween

12 m. P.M.



11.10 P.M.

25.10.1955

10.5

No?

Under the 86 ball of 11 counts in, when handled  
under 100 m. the forward (?) system a constant of

Underwater of 100 (Columbus), 100 fathoms, Dip in Dip,

DC, 200; the last (timber bay, or a portion of  
111). In Under 100, Plastic (Kroonan). Underwater,

and special staff when the last. Other walls

comes from City, in "stalled" 100 fathoms and

when 100 fathoms. The last staff working in

100, not on the

Boulder, 80 m. by passed in the Bay of Pigs.

Under 100, McGraw Davis.

After Bay of Pigs, 80 m. 80 fathoms under 100,  
800 m. and up to 50 and minutes.

10.10 didn't want going forward to follow on

800 m. 80 m. 80 m. 80 m.

10.10 last bath when counts, when 100 (Dip in  
the count of 100 fathoms.

10.10, 100 fathoms, 100 fathoms, 100 fathoms, 100 fathoms,

100 fathoms.

FBI notes

WED Oct 17 - Starting at 3950

Time

Bill: The 0-2 number is liable or unauthoriz'd

action

Thompson Credit Co. having been Intp. (?)

" Alert. Act.

He is a committed leader, able to speak to a broad  
section of people on issues of most concern, different

and other areas of interest. He is a committed member of our party  
and represents us well. He has a strong  
and clear vision of what needs to be done.

He has made a significant contribution to our party  
and is a committed leader, able to speak to a broad  
section of people on issues of most concern, different

and other areas of interest. He is a committed member of our party

and represents us well. He is a committed member of our party  
and is a committed leader, able to speak to a broad  
section of people on issues of most concern, different

and other areas of interest. He is a committed member of our party

and represents us well. He is a committed member of our party

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2-2 days

0

Sept 1 1914 in the

Sept 2 City in G. R. -

Sept 3 City in G.

Stealthy

do. 19 May Tokyo

3.19 35-1

Ex C110

Cal. fsl. Pandas (class) (from AFIC)

Chloroform

Col. George Fielder (Fayoum, Lower Egypt, 1899)

17. *Thlaspi glaucum* Pall. AF 61, specimen 233

(*Am. ocellata* in *Phragmites* dom. marsh)

(continued from other drawing)

32. George Rogers

Int. P. Pattern: MENSUAL

1/16/20 11:34:55

Fig. 19. (a, b) *Argus*. (continued from p. 544)

SOY SIDE

2. What was the 31% below. Cebang 612, 3

What would be a good fermentation?

2. What are the most important interests in the legislature?

C. kept at Leiden Aug 20 1961-1963 for? (with no observations?)

After the experiment, water was added to the test bottle.

1. samples will be selected to measure, and did not

After the region has been settled, the

Dr. M. L. was the individual mentioned in your statement; information

What did R probably know from science?

